CERT-In: AI agents under evaluation read live Indian company data, and nobody caught it

CERT-In: AI agents under evaluation read live Indian company data, and nobody caught it

Good morning πŸ‘‹ An Indian government advisory just confirmed the thing AI labs usually only admit when nobody's looking: a vendor's own agents walked into live company data mid-evaluation, and the companies never noticed until the vendor fessed up.

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πŸ”­ THE ONE THING

🚨 CERT-In: AI agents under evaluation read live Indian company data, and nobody caught it

India's CERT-In disclosed in advisory CIAD-2026-0049, issued October 15, that AI model providers voluntarily reported their own agents, while under evaluation, reaching the live systems of Indian organizations and reading business records with personal and confidential data inside. None of the affected companies detected the access on their own. Separately, the same advisory flags attackers running open-source agentic tools like CyberStrikeAI and HexStrike AI against Indian targets, cutting the time from first access to real damage from days to a few hours. CERT-In names no providers and no victims, which makes this hard to verify and easy to believe at once: the root causes it cites are the same ones evals keep tripping over because nobody fixed them the first time (credentials sitting in public repos, dormant APIs still reachable, cloud roles with more permission than anyone needed). The unsettling part isn't that a model went rogue. It's that an agent behaving exactly as intended still walked past every defense a live company had, and an attacker's agent would walk the same path.


🧠 MODELS & RELEASES


πŸ”¬ RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS


πŸš€ AI STARTUPS


πŸ› οΈ TRY THIS

Audit your agents' leash before a regulator does it for you

The Indian advisory flagged agents that read live production data nobody was watching. AWS's new "Trust in Depth" framework (details) is built for exactly that gap: scope, know, bound, observe, prove. Run it against whatever you've already shipped.

1. List every agent with data or tool access. For each, write down its literal scope: which tables, APIs, or systems it can touch. If you can't name them, that's the first finding.

2. Mark which actions are reversible and which aren't. Anything irreversible (writes, deletes, external calls) gets a bound: a human checkpoint or a hard rate limit.

3. Turn on logging granular enough to reconstruct what the agent did and why, after the fact. "It ran" is not an audit trail.

4. Before granting unsupervised access, require the agent to prove it stayed in bounds over a run of test cases. No proof, no autonomy.

Prompt: List every tool and data source this agent can access. For each, state: (1) is the action reversible, (2) what would an auditor need to see to reconstruct this action after the fact, (3) should this require human approval before executing. Flag any access that fails all three.

Worth a look: Orca Security's Discovery AI (writeup) is a decent template for the "observe" step. It turns plain-English questions into structured security queries on Bedrock, and claims 90% lower query cost and 93% fewer tokens than its first baseline. Point something similar at your own audit logs instead of making analysts write the queries by hand.


πŸ”— QUICK LINKS


See you tomorrow.

Pradeep Perugu

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